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The Financing Lease
As a Security Agreement
Leasing Service Corp. v. American National Bank & Trust
Co., 19 UCC REP. SERV. 252 (D.N.J. 1976).
I. INTRODUCTION
Draftsmen of the Uniform Commercial Code, in an effort to
standardize the legal effect of many types of credit transactions,
included within the scope of Article 9 "any transaction (regardless
of its form) which is intended to create a security interest in
personal property or fixtures."' For purposes of the Code, a "'se-
curity interest' means an interest in personal property or fixtures
which secures payment or performance of an obligation.
'2
The increasing frequency with which lease agreements have
been used to acquire equipment, or to finance such an acquisition,
has given rise to frequent controversies over when a lease is a "true
lease," and when it is a "lease intended as a security agreement."
Classification of a lease as a security agreement results in the lease,
and the lessor, being subject to the rules of the Code.
Although a "true lease" does not have to be filed to protect the
interests of the lessor, a "security lease" makes the lessor a secured
party, subject to the filing and perfection requirements of Article 9.
Noncompliance with those requirements causes the "lessor" to be
unprotected against properly perfected secured parties, judgment
creditors and creditors in bankruptcy. Similarly, a "lessor" found
to be in fact a secured party will be limited by and subjected to the
remedial provisions of the Code in the event of a default by the
lessee, and will, in appropriate circumstances, be subject to the
seller's warranty provisions of Article 2. In addition, there are
numerous other ramifications, including potential problems with
usury laws.
The Code itself gives limited guidance as to the appropriate
resolution of the issue in any particular situation:
1. U.C.C. § 9-102(a) (1972 version).
2. U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1972 version).
SECURITY INTERESTS
Whether a lease is intended as security is to be determined by the
facts of each case; however, (a) the inclusion of an option to pur-
chase does not of itself make the lease one intended for security,
and (b) an agreement that upon compliance with the terms of the
lease the lessee shall become or has the option to become the owner
of the property for no additional consideration or for a nominal
consideration does make the lease one intended for security.
3
In all situations where the conclusive presumptions of part (b)
above do not establish that a particular agreement is a "lease
intended as security," resolution of the issue is determined on the
basis of the intent of the parties.
One such situation where the Code offers no specific instruc-
tion is where there is no purchase option of any kind contained in
the provisions of the lease agreement. Although it is clear that the
absence of a purchase option does not establish conclusively that a
transaction is a "true lease, ' 4 the general impression of courts and
commentators alike has been that, under an "intent of the parties"
test, the absence of an option to purchase was strong evidence that
the parties intended to form a "true lease." Leases not containing
an option to purchase consistently have been held not to be intend-
ed as security and therefore not subject to Article 9 of the Code.,
In the absence of convincing evidence that the lease was intended
as a security agreement, leases not containing purchase options"
generally have been upheld as "true leases."
A recent New Jersey case poses the question of whether the
foregoing analyses of the law are still valid. Leasing Service Corp.
v. American National Bank & Trust Co.7 involved a no-option
lease which the court held to be a conditional sale-security agree-
ment almost solely on the basis of the fact that the total rental
payments over the sixty-month term exceeded the original cost of
the equipment by some 37 Per cent. However, several factors
combine to make the precedential value of the decision question-
able, including the unique advocacy positions of the parties and the
atypical circumstances of the transactions involved.s
3. Id.
4. [T]he presence of an option to purchase does not "of itself"
make the lease a security lease (what "of itself" means is
further explained by clause (b)). The negative implication
is that the absence of an option to purchase would not neces-
sarily, or "of itself," make the lease a true lease.
G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY, § 11.2, at 338
(1965).
5. Del Duca, Evolving Standards for Distinguishing a "Bona Fide Lease"
from a "Lease Intended as Security"--Impact on Priorities, 75 CoM.
L.J. 218 (1970) (authorities omitted).
6. Hereinafter cited in the text as no-option leases.
7. 19 UCC REP. SERV. 252 (D.N.J. 1976).
8. See § VI infra.
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II. THE FACTS OF THE CASE
A. The Dispute
Leasing Service Corporation entered into a series of lease trans-
actions with a company called "Audio." All of the transactions
used form leases, specifying that Leasing Service "would secure
from a specified supplier specified equipment to be leased to
Audio for specified monthly rental payments to be paid according
to a specified payment schedule."9  Each of the documents con-
tained a paragraph to the effect that the lessor reserved a "security
interest in any and all property wherever located, now or hereafter
belonging to lessee or in which lessee has any interest,"' 0 and each
was filed with the Secretary of State.
Subsequent to the filing of the last of the lease agreements,
Audio entered into a loan agreement with defendant American
National Bank & Trust Company, through which American re-
ceived a security interest in all of Audio's property. When Audio
later defaulted on the payments required by the loan agreement,
American took possession of all of Audio's property, including the
leased property. The leased property subsequently was returned to
Leasing Service, while the remainder of Audio's property was sold
at a foreclosure sale. Leasing Service then sued American and the
successor of the purchaser of the property, claiming a prior security
interest in that property. Thus, the dispute in this case was not
over the leased property, but rather was concerned with all of
Audio's other property.
Leasing Service claimed a prior security interest, arguing that
the lease documents fulfilled the requirement for a security agree-
ment and had been filed in the appropriate place, thus fulfilling the
requirement for a financing statement. American asserted that
Leasing Service was not a secured party as to any of Audio's
property, arguing that: (1) the documents were "true leases"
and not "leases intended as security," thus failing to fulfill the
requirement of a security agreement; (2) even if the "leases" were
9. 19 UCC REP. SERv. at 259. The transactions were thus what have come
to be called "finance leases," in that the lessor is neither manufacturer
nor dealer of the leased property. The equipment that is leased is
ordered to the specifications of the lessee and in turn rented to the
lessee. The lessor seldom even sees the property, and usually has
no desire to own it in the sense of having the actual use of it. Such
leases are to be distinguished from those where the lessor is also a
dealer in the type of property leased, and the specific property is either
selected from the inventory of the lessor or manufactured by the lessor
to comply with the specifications of the lessee.
10. Id. at 261.
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intended as security, they were not valid financing statements, and
thus Leasing Service was not perfected; 1 and (3) even if perfect-
ed, the description of the collateral in the agreements was inade-
quate to perfect an interest in any property other than the leased
property itself.
1 2
B. The Leases
All of the agreements involved were variations of the same
form lease.13 The court interpreted only the last of the series,
determining that the leases were intended as security, evidently
satisfied that any variations between the individual leases were im-
material to the issue.'
4
The lease agreements encompassed a five-year term, and called
for monthly rental payments. After the first 36 months, the month-
ly rental was to decrease by more than half.'5 The lessee agreed to
provide casualty insurance on the property; to continue to pay rent
even in the event of destruction or theft of the equipment; to pay
all taxes occasioned by the transaction, including all property taxes;
to indemnify the lessor against any and all claims and liability; and
to pay a non-refundable "advance rent" deposit upon acceptance of
the leases by the lessor.' 6 In addition, the lease contained a
provision for acceleration of rental payments and the payment of
attorneys fees by the lessee in the event of a default.' 7
III. THE COURT'S DISPOSITION OF THE ISSUE
The court found that the no-option leases described above were
not "true leases" but rather were "leases intended as security," and
thus that Leasing Service was a secured party. Although the
11. Having found that the leases were security agreements, the court dis-
posed of this argument summarily, finding that even though the se-
curity agreements (i.e., the leases) contained no description of the
types of collateral, they did give notice of the existence of a security
agreement. The court held that this was sufficient under the "notice"
filing concept, and thus that the leases constituted adequate financing
statements. Id. at 263.
12. The court held that under U.C.C. § 9-110 and its rule of "reasonable
identification," "[t]he description in 14-'any and all property wher-
ever located'-was amply sufficient to put defendant American on no-
tice that its sale of any of Audio's property would violate plaintiff's
prior security interest." Id.
13. Id. at 258.
14. Id. at 258-59.
15. Id. at 259.
16. Id. at 260.
17. Id.
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decision certainly is not the first to hold such no-option leases to be
in fact disguised security agreements, if the court's reasoning is
taken at face value, the decision does present a novel approach.
According to the court, the crucial factor in its decision was the
fact that the total rental payments over the five-year term exceeded
the original cost of the leased property by "approximately 37 per
cent."'
The cost of the equipment was listed at $42,496.00. Thus the
total rent over the five-year lease term exceeded the value of the
equipment by approximately 37 per cent .... It is therefore clear
that each lease contemplates rental payments far in excess of the
value of the leased equipment, and that the transaction must be
viewed as a conditional sale.10
[Tjhe degree by which the total rentals exceed the pur-
chase value of the equipment compels the conclusion that no
residual proprietary rights were contemplated by Leasing at the
end of the five-year term. 20
Although the court discussed the requirements that the lessee
insure, pay taxes, and provide a deposit, and although it made note
of the acceleration provision, it is clear that the court considered
these factors merely to be additional support for its conclusion. It
was most concerned with what it viewed as an exorbitant rate of
return on the investment of the lessor.
The fact that Leasing Service held a no-option lease to be a
"lease intended as security" is significant in and of itself because of
the small number of cases reaching the same conclusion. However,
if the court did consider the "excessive" rent to be the decisive
factor, the case represents an even more significant departure from
prior law.
IV. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
Traditionally, when courts have been faced with the issue of
whether a transaction which purports to be a lease is in fact a lease
or is instead a disguised security device, the inquiry has focused on
a determination of which party has the ownership or control of the
equity interest in the leased property. This test has been stated in
a number of different ways: Does the lessee acquire anything
18. Id. at 259. The court arrived at the 37% figure by comparing the
total return under the lease ($58,124.48) to the original cost to the
lessor (listed as $42,496.00). The excess ($15,628.48) amounts to ap-
proximately 37% of the original cost.
19. Id. at 259.
20. Id. at 260.
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more by making the rental payments than the right to the use of
the property for a term of years? Does the lessor retain any
proprietary rights in the property? These variations are all refor-
mulations of the same basic principle.
The principle was developed in pre-Code days, because many
courts considered long-term "lease" transactions to be inherently
suspect as disguised security devices, and therefore the courts
inquired into the functional effect of such transactions. Factors
considered in the analysis included the term of the lease in relation
to the anticipated economic life and usefulness of the lease proper-
ty; whether the payments specified in the lease approximated the
fair rental value of the property; the effect of obsolescence and
depreciation; as well as evidence of the lessor's past practices with
respect to the recovery, use, or sale of leased property at expiration
or termination of other leases.
The principle remains viable because of the Code's reliance
upon an "intent of the parties" test in all cases other than those to
which the conclusive presumptions of the Code apply.2 1 Thus the
courts still focus on the "functional effect of the transaction" as
indicative of the parties' intent, and the same factors continue to be
relevant.
V. ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON
Because of the small number of reported cases finding no-
option leases to be leases intended as security, a brief summary of
the facts and analysis of each, coupled with comparison to Leasing
Service, is useful.
The only case cited by the Leasing Service court as direct
authority for its conclusion was In re Transcontinental Industries,
Inc., 22 a proceeding in bankruptcy, in which certain no-option
leases were found to be leases intended for security. While the
situation surrounding the transaction was similar to that in Leasing
Service, the Bankruptcy Referee did not emphasize the fact that the
rent payments exceeded the purchase price, but rather considered
evidence of a type conspicuously absent in Leasing Service: (1)
an express renewal option by which the lessee could renew the
lease as many times as it desired at a cost of two per cent per
year,23 (although the Leasing Service agreement forms contained a
provision relating to renewal terms, the court noted that the provi-
21. See U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (b) (1972 version).
22. 3 UCC REP. SERv. 235 (N.D. Ga. 1965).
23. Id. at 243.
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sion was not filled in);24 (2) evidence that at the completion of the
lease term lessee had a right to a first opportunity to purchase the
property; 25 and (3) evidence from which the referee concluded
that the lessor's customers always retained the equipment at the
end of the lease term through exercise of either the renewal option
or the right of first refusal. 26 Thus, although In re Transcontinen-
tal Industries, Inc. was authority for the conclusion reached in Leas-
ing Service, it did not support the analysis used in the determina-
tion.
In re Brothers Coach Corp.2 7 likewise held a no-option lease to
be intended as security, but again on facts showing stronger evi-
dence that such was the intent of the parties. Although the lease
had no option to purchase, it did provide that upon the expiration
or termination of the lease or if the lessor obtained possession by
reason of default, the lessor would cause the property to be sold
subject to the following provision:
Upon Lessee's written request, Lessor shall promptly furnish Les-
see with an accounting of such sale. If the net proceeds exceed
the depreciated value of said equipment,28 Lessor shall pay or
credit the excess to Lessee as a refund of a portion of the rentals
theretofore paid by Lessee; .... 29
The court found that this provision was the functional equivalent
of a purchase option in that it gave to the lessee the proprietary
rights to any equity in the property:
Though the agreement fails to provide for the transfer of title to
the "Lessee", the Lessee has the only interest in the equity....
Though the ultimate determination is not based on title or the
transfer of title, the agreement clearly invests the "Lessee" with
the rights and obligations of ownership subject only to the lien
of the "Lessor" to the extent of the payments due as depreciated
value as that term is described in the agreement.3 0
This same type of reasoning was applied in John Deere Co. v.
Wonderland Realty Corp.31 to find that a no-option lease contained
an express provision which constituted the functional equivalent of
an option to purchase. The agreement had not only a renewal
24. 19 UCC REP. SEav. at 259.
25. 3 UCC REP. SERv. at 243.
26. Id. at 244.
27. 9 UCC RaP. SERV. 502 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
28. The rental payment was described as a "monthly depreciation re-
serve," and the "depreciated value" was defined by the agreement to
be the stipulated original value minus the "depreciation reserve" pay-
ments collected up to that point in time. Id. at 502-03.
29. Id. at 503.
30. Id. at 504.
31. 38 Mich. App. 88, 195 N.W.2d 871 (1972).
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option, but also a provision whereby the lessee had an option to sell
the equipment at the end of the three-year term with all proceeds of
the sale which exceeded unpaid rent going to the lessee.3 2 Thus,
the lessee could bid at the sale as high as necessary to become the
successful bidder, and never be obligated to pay more than the
amount of the agreed rental.3 3 The court held that although there
was no "option" as such, the express provisions of the agreement
allowed the lessee to become the owner of the equipment for no
additional consideration. Therefore, the lease was classified as one
intended for security under the Code definition.
The only other cases where a no-option lease was held to
constitute a security agreement involved separate oral agreements
providing the option,3 4 and subsequent written modification of the
lease whereby a purchase option was granted.35
Thus, none of the cases which could be cited as authority for
the result in Leasing Service lend any credence to the court's
emphasis on the amount of the rentals as establishing the requisite
evidence of intent to create a security interest. All the cases
reported herein were decided on the basis of a finding that al-
though no actual option to purchase was included within the terms
of the agreement, there were express provisions granting the lessee
the functional equivalent of a purchase option. These provisions
included renewal options, oral purchase options, or provisions
granting the lessee a vested interest in the equity.
Even if it is conceded that the status of any "lease" as a security
agreement must be determined from the circumstances of the
particular transaction, and thus that supportive precedent for any
particular set of facts nearly always will be lacking, there is author-
ity which is directly contrary to the result reached in Leasing
Service. Lockwood Industrial Leasing Corp. v. Sabetta3 6 is nearly
indistinguishable from Leasing Service on a factual basis. Lockwood
involved a financing lease of equipment and fixtures to a retail
grocery business. The lease was for a seven-year term, and did not
contain a purchase option. The cost of the leased property was
approximately $30,000.00, and the total rentals over the term
amounted to $47,434.68. 37 A copy of the lease agreement was
32. Id. at 92, 195 N.W.2d at 873.
33. Id.
34. In re Walter W. Willis, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 1274 (N.D. Ohio 1970), affd,
440 F.2d 995 (6th Cir. 1971).
35. In re Virginia Air Conditioning Co., 11 UCC REP. S~nv. 1260 (W.D.
Va. 19-72).
36. 16 UCC REP. SERV. 195 (D. Conn. 1974).
37. Id. at 197. Note that if these figures are substituted into the formula
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filed by the lessor,3 8 and, as in Leasing Service, the lease purported
to give the lessor some type of an interest in "after-acquired
property" of the lessee.39 The Lockwood court began its analysis
from the traditional basis:
[T]he pivotal issue in determining whether or not a particular
lease is one intended for security is whether the lessee's payments
under it are just for the use of the property or whether they are
to result in the lessee's acquisition of the ownership, the beneficial
interest or equity in the leased goods. Since the lease here con-
tained no option-to-buy provision we must analyze the facts es-
tablished by the evidnce [sic] to resolve whether or not this lease
was one intended for security.
4 0
Beginning with the provisions of the lease agreement, the court
found no evidence that the lessee had any right to obtain ownership
of the leased goods. The fact that the total rental exceeded the
purchase value of the equipment was found not to have "such
probative weight as either to alter the terms of the lease or to
promote the conclusion that the parties to the lease understood that
the partnership was to obtain a property interest in the leased
equipment." 41 Similarly, the inclusion in the description of the
leased equipment of "all presently owned and hereafter acquired
personal property," and the filing of a financing statement with an
"after-acquired property" clause was dismissed as an awkward
attempt to obtain security for the rental payments.
42
The court found no parol evidence which implied that the
intent of the parties was any different than indicated by the express
terms of the lease.43 The court summarized the situation as fol-
lows:
In the view of this court, the right to obtain ownership of prop-
erty is not to be decided by conjecture or guesswork but by the im-
pact of evidence rationally interpreted with logical inferences drawn
therefrom. And to find that there is probative persuasion to be-
and terminology of Leasing Service, supra note 18, the amount by
which total rentals exceeded original cost in Industrial was approxi-
mately 58% over a seven year term, as compared to 37% over the
five year term of Leasing Service.
38. Id. at 198. The financing statement contained the legend: "This
filing is a memo of the lease transaction."
39. Id. at 200.
40. Id. at 199.
41. Id. at 202. Earlier, the court had typified this transaction as a now"common" situation where one party obtains the use of equipment
in return for making payments which "in the end will pay for the
equipment and leave the financier a respectable profit on the arrange-
ment." Id. at 198.
42. Id. at 200.
43. Id.
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lieve that a lease is one intended for security because the transac-
tion is one in which the lessee seeks financing to obtain the use
of equipment he is unable to pay for by turning to a financing
house whose business is to furnish such monetary assistance is to
say that there can be no true lease ever entered into by such par-
ties but all, as a matter of law, must be characterized as leases
intended as security.44
VI. THE EFFECT OF THE DECISION
Leasing Service marks a significant departure from traditional
analysis of no-option leases, not only in the emphasis placed on the
"lessor's" rate of return on its investment, but also because the
court dealt with the "intent of the parties" issue directly in terms of
an intent to create a security interest, rather than in the traditional
focus on an intent that the lessee will obtain a proprietary interest
in the leased property.
When predicting the possible impact of Leasing Service, it is
important to consider some facts which may cause the Leasing
Service analysis to be of limited application to other situations.
First, the "lessor" asserted that the transaction was not a lease,
while a defendant, not a party to the "lease" transaction, asserted
that the document was in fact what it purported to be. All of the
conflicts in the other cases cited herein saw the roles reversed, with
the lessors arguing "true lease," and third parties presenting evi-
dence of a contrary intent of the parties to the "lease." Because
these cases look to the true intent of the parties to the "lease," the
assertions of such a party that the intent was not as it appears car-
ries more probative force than assertions by a nonparty, who is not
likely to have first-hand knowledge. While the lessor's rate of return
may be relevant in all such conflicts, when it is relied upon by one
who was not a party to the transaction it may not be enough in
and of itself to overcome both the written provisions of the agree-
ment and the assertions of a party.
Second, the court's discussion of whether or not these "leases"
were in fact security agreements must be classified as dictum,
because a finding that the leases were "true leases" would not have
been fatal to Leasing Service's asserted security interest. It must
be reiterated that the conflict was not over the leased property, but
over other property of the lessee. Thus, all that was needed to
sustain the claim of the lessor as to a prior security interest in that
other property was a finding that the after-acquired property clause
contained in the leases was itself a "security agreement." There is
44. Id. at 202-03.
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no procedural prohibition against a single document serving as a
"true lease" with respect to some property, while at the same time
serving to create a security interest in other property not the subject
of the lease transaction.4 5 It is submitted that, because the proper-
ty at issue was not the property which was the subject of the lease,
the court's inquiry into whether that property was in fact "leased"
or instead the subject of a conditional sale was superfluous to the
resolution of the conflict.
Third, although the court made several assertions that the
parties could not have contemplated that the lessor would have any
residual proprietary rights in the equipment at the end of the
term,4 6 the court specified that it received no evidence regarding
the anticipated useful life of the equipment or its projected value at
the end of the lease term.4 7 Positive evidence of anticipated value at
the end of the term might have overcome what the court seems to
have treated as a presumption arising from the rate of return.
Finally, even assuming that the foregoing facts do not seriously
undercut the precedential value of the case, the line of inquiry
adopted by the court does not lend itself to predictable results.
The agreements at issue contained express recitations that "[t]he
equipment is, and shall remain, the property of lessor," and that
"[1] essee shall have no right, title or interest in or to the equip-
ment except as expressly set forth in this lease. '4 8 The financing
statements which were filed contained the legend that the filings
were for "informational purposes only," the transaction being a
lease and not a conditional sale. It is thus difficult to discern
exactly what more a "true lessor" could do to insure that a lease
transaction would be upheld as what it purported to be. If a rate
of return which a court deems to be excessive were allowed to
overcome the express provisions of an agreement in the context of
a lessor asserting the agreement as a "true lease," the only recourse
45. Under U.C.C. § 1-201 (37), "security interest" means an interest in per-
sonal property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of
an obligation. Under U.C.C. § 9-105 (h), "security agreement" means
an agreement which creates or provides for a security interest. U.C.C.
§ 9-201 provides that: "Except as otherwise provided by this Act
a security agreement is effective according to its terms between the
parties, against purchasers of the collateral and against creditors."
Despite all of the "terms of art" of the Code, a security agreement re-
mains essentially a contract, and the parties thereto retain the freedom
to grant or retain precisely the interest that they want in precisely
the property that they want.
46. See notes 19 and 20 and accompanying text supra.
47. 19 UCC REP. SERv. at 260.
48. Id. at 261.
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a "true lessor" would have would be to reduce that rate of return.
What constitutes an "unreasonable rate of return" is a very am-
biguous standard upon which to hinge the classification of what
often are "high stakes" financing transactions. Although financ-
ing leases are subject to much abuse, such leases do perform a
legitimate function in this age of high overhead. Legal standards
which require a lessor to sacrifice a reasonable margin of profit in
order to insure protection only serve to compound the problem and
have no place in modern commercial law.
Paul D. Hietbrink '77
